RESOURCE

G7 Call to Action: Preparing for the Post-Quantum Era

CISA and the G7 Cyber Security Working Group (including Canada's Cyber Centre) have jointly told organizations and governments to start migrating to post-quantum cryptography now, not when a quantum computer arrives.

Fabric Networks

PUBLISHED

September 2, 2026

SOURCE

Canadian Centre for Cyber Security / G7

OUR TAKE BY

Fabric Networks Inc., Calgary. Reviewed against the primary source linked below.

On September 3, 2026, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and its G7 Cyber Security Working Group partners (Canada's Canadian Centre for Cyber Security among them) released Preparing for the Post-Quantum Era: A Call to Action.

What it says

Quantum computers will eventually break the public key cryptography that protects most sensitive data and communications today. The threat is not only future: adversaries are already running harvest now, decrypt later campaigns, capturing encrypted traffic to unlock once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) exists. Once that day comes, anyone still relying on public key encryption is exposed to impersonation of trusted entities, compromised equipment, and loss of confidential data.

The G7's direction is plain: do not wait for a CRQC. Identify critical assets, map cryptographic dependencies, and build a phased transition plan aligned with your national cyber authority.

Five priority areas

  • Raise awareness of the quantum threat across leadership and operations
  • Develop and follow national post-quantum strategies
  • Advance research and development in quantum-safe technologies
  • Strengthen public private partnerships on migration
  • Integrate post-quantum cryptography into security requirements and procurement

What it means in Canada

The Cyber Centre co-signed the call to action and points Canadian organizations to its existing guidance: ITSAP.00.017: Preparing your organization for the quantum threat to cryptography, and ITSM.40.001: Roadmap for the migration to post-quantum cryptography for the Government of Canada. Both call for a risk based, phased migration that starts with a cryptographic asset inventory.

Our take

You can't fix what you can't see. The G7 did not tell anyone to buy a product; it told them to inventory their cryptography and map the dependencies. That is Phase 1, Detect, and it is what a Discovery Program produces this fall: a cryptographic bill of materials, dated, that a regulator or a board can read. Assess this fall, budget in 2027, secured by January 2028.

Want to go deeper?

Start with a conversation about your cryptographic posture.