RESOURCE

Le Centre pour la cybersécurité et ses alliés préviennent que des acteurs liés à la Chine volent des données avec des réseaux de zombies, des balayeurs et d'anciennes vulnérabilités

L'avis conjoint AA26-281A, cosigné par le Centre canadien pour la cybersécurité et des partenaires de six autres pays, indique que des acteurs appuyés par le Integrity Technology Group de Chine combinent balayage automatisé, grands réseaux de zombies et exploitation manuelle pour voler des données sensibles à des organisations du monde entier, y compris des infrastructures essentielles.

Fabric Networks

PUBLISHED

October 7, 2026

SOURCE

FBI, CISA, NSA, NCSC and partners including the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (AA26-281A)

OUR TAKE BY

Fabric Networks Inc., Calgary. Reviewed against the primary source linked below.

Want to go deeper?

Start with a conversation about your cryptographic posture.

On October 8, 2026 the FBI, CISA, NSA and the UK's NCSC published joint cybersecurity advisory AA26-281A with the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security and agencies in Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Spain. It describes Chinese government linked actors, enabled by the Integrity Technology Group, combining automated scanning tools, large botnets and manual exploitation to steal sensitive data from organizations worldwide, including critical infrastructure.

The techniques are not exotic. The actors use scanning, cross site scripting and password spraying against Microsoft Exchange servers, exploit vulnerabilities with identifiers going back to 2014, establish persistence by installing legitimate VPN client software on victim machines, and package stolen email and credentials for exfiltration. The advice is to disable unused services and ports (including remote access, automatic configuration and file sharing), require multifactor authentication, segment edge devices and patch promptly.

Our take

This campaign is about taking data now, at scale, through doors that have been open for years. Some of what leaves is encrypted, and what cannot be read today can be kept. The first defence is knowing what is exposed: which edge devices, which remote access paths, which protocols and which keys. You can't fix what you can't see. Disable, isolate or tunnel, not run alongside.